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Abstract
The determinants of change in trust have long been a matter of debate in the
social capital literature. An area of particular interest for political scientists
has been trust in state institutions because of the possible consequences
it could have on democratic life. In an attempt to generalize results, most
studies have focused on large cross-sectional samples. However, these
studies overlook the context in which citizens and state institutions find
themselves. The case study of Mexico presented in this paper attempts to
contribute to the literature by emphasizing context over generalizability.
The case of Mexican state institutions supports the hypothesis that events
that taint an institution for not performing according to its prescribed
function lead to sharp declines in trust. Consequently, structural reforms
that ensure that institutions recur to their constitutive norm may help
increase trust in state institutions. In addition, there is strong evidence
indicating that GDP growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions.
Therefore, democracies in developing countries may benefit when their
economies are performing well.

Introduction
My desire to write this thesis is perhaps best explained by a true
story. A friend of mine has a house on a very secluded beach on the Mexican
Pacific coast. He invited me to escape the Philadelphia winter and spend
a week in the sun. This was March 2009. The son of the lady that works
at the house came to pick us up at the airport. As we were riding in the
truck our conversation naturally shifted towards the state of insecurity in the
country – a very common occurrence in Mexican small-talk. Our driver said
that things were very calm around his neighborhood because of the presence
of drug lords. We inquired how this was so. He said, “the cartel has put a
new operative in place called Operación Limpieza (Operation Cleanup) that
has made robbers and kidnappers stay out of my neighborhood. The capos
want to make money by selling drugs in the streets. But who is going to go
out and buy drugs when it is not safe to be on the streets. The cartel posted
warnings and murdered anyone who robbed or kidnapped.” I wanted to ask
more, but our driver immediately changed the subject.
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After this conversation, numerous questions started building
up in my head. Have the narcos replaced public security institutions? Do
some Mexicans trust the drug cartels more than the state? How has this
affected other Mexican institutions? How has this affected the rule of law
in the country? These fascinating questions were enough to keep me busy
doing years of field research, perhaps enough to write a book. Given time
and geographical constraints, I decided to search for available information
on Mexican institutions. After months of searching, I came across a survey
conducted by Consulta Mitofsky that measures trust in a variety of the
county’s institutions. Unfortunately, the survey was conducted at a national
level, impeding the possibility of comparing institutional trust among states
with high vs. low cartel presence. Therefore, I chose to use this national data
in order to reveal the factors that cause variations in trust in Mexican state
institutions. The central question of this research paper is: what explains
changes in trust in Mexican state institutions?
Although different from the initial inquiries, this research question is
equally ambitious. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on the determinants
of institutional trust from an in-depth and context-based perspective, rather
than through a cross-sectional and generalizable approach. The case of
Mexico is particularly interesting because it is a developing country that has
recently democratized. As such, the second ambitious characteristic of this
research endeavor is that it sheds light on the importance of trust in state
institutions for young democracies in developing countries. This is made
possible by the implications of theories on the determinants of institutional
trust from which the hypotheses tested in this paper are derived. Testing the
direct effects of institutional trust on democracy would be too complicated of
a task. Finally, answering this research question suggests means of action to
improve young democracies and identifies economic scenarios that catalyze
the further development of democratic society.
The arguments defended by the case of Mexican state institutions are
twofold. Firstly, events that taint an institution for not performing according
to its prescribed function lead to sharp declines in trust. Consequently,
structural reforms that ensure institutions recur to their constitutive norm
may help increase trust in state institutions. Secondly, there is strong evidence
indicating that GDP growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions.
Therefore, democracies in developing countries may benefit when their
economies perform well. In order to explain as clearly as possible how these
arguments were reached, the paper is divided into six sections. The first
section delves into the literature on trust, bringing in definitions of key terms,
explaining the debate on the relation between democracy and trust, and
developing three basic arguments derived from theories on the determinants
of institutional trust. The second section presents three hypotheses derived
from the literature and their respective causal mechanisms. The third section
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clarifies the selected data and justifies the methodology used for testing the
hypotheses. The fourth section describes the data results succinctly, while
the fifth section analyzes these results. Finally, the sixth section concludes.
Literature Review
Trust in State Institutions and Democracies
Trust can take a variety of forms. In the most general sense, “trust
involves a judgment, however implicit, to accept vulnerability to the potential
ill will of others by granting them discretionary power over some good. When
one trusts, one accepts some amount of risk for potential harm in exchange
for the benefits of cooperation” (Warren 1). Indeed, risk is a central aspect
of trust and the outcome that is put at risk to others’ malfeasance is of some
value to the person that is deciding whether to trust (Tilly 4). Nevertheless,
cooperation increases by taking such risks, allowing social coordination
problems to be resolved. (Leslie 540). However, an important distinction is
that trusting an individual is not the same as trusting an institution. Unlike
institutions, individuals can reciprocate and interact in face-to-face relations.
Consequently, it is somewhat harder to trust an institution – some even
believe that it is impossible to do so (Hardin 35). This dispute on institutional
trust, which will be thoroughly developed in the next section, is reflected in
the views regarding the decline in political institutions within the United
States and Western Europe over the past decades (Inglehart 4, 1997). The
central question in this debate asks: is the decline of trust in state institutions
favorable or unfavorable for democracies?
The debate on the relation between institutional trust and democracy
remains unresolved. However, finding the factors that determine this
type of trust sheds light on which stance to take on the debate. On one
hand, the cry for democracy stems – at least in part – from a lack of trust
in authorities. If people in Tunisia were willing to sacrifice their lives to
overthrow the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally, it is clear that the trust
relationship between the citizens and this party had severely deteriorated.
Indeed, political legitimacy and trust in government are highly interrelated
(Inglehart 104). Furthermore, even developed democracies impose checks
and balances on state institutions, as if acknowledging that full trust in the
system’s institutions is never warranted. On the other hand, some argue that
a prerequisite for democratization is the incorporation of trust networks by
the government (Tilly 22). In other words, a democracy requires a society
that trusts the government will commit – and is able – to fulfill its functions.
Moreover, even fully democratized nations benefit from institutional trust.
Given that political resources are scarce, warranted trust in particular
institutions permits people in democracies to invest their resources more
effectively – namely where trust is not warranted (Warren 4). Also, checks
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and balances are not necessarily proof of the undesirability of institutional
trust within democracies since their function is precisely that of facilitating
trust in government institutions. This debate remains unresolved given the
complications that arise when testing what institutions (if any) deserve trust
conditional on the stage of democratization. Nonetheless, it is possible to test
what factors cause changes in institutional trust. The arguments for these
factors have theoretical bases that imply either a favorable or an unfavorable
view of institutional trust for democracies.
Because theories on the determinants of institutional trust have
implications on the effect that trust in state institutions has on democracy,
revealing these factors is important not only in itself, but also because it may
justify the stance taken on the aforementioned debate. The following section
clarifies existing theories found in the literature from which three arguments
to construct hypotheses are derived. Moreover, the implications that these
arguments have on the relation between democracy and trust in state
institutions are clarified. The three arguments are divided into the following
subsections: materialist, functional, and security.
The Determinants of Institutional Trust
Materialist Argument
The materialist argument states that low trust in state institutions
is not necessarily an unfavorable condition for a democracy. The theories
that support this argument affirm that institutional trust is incredibly
hard to justify. In its most extreme form, the theories rely on the notion of
encapsulated trust, which denies the normative possibility of trusting an
institution. But even theorists that believe that institutional trust is possible
provide materialist arguments. Both explain the declining trust in state
institutions as a result of people refining their conditions for trust. The
cause for this refinement lies in increasing material well-being (hence the
materialist argument). As such, a decline in trust in state institutions may
imply that people are actually better off.
Encapsulated trust, as explained by Russell Hardin, questions the
normative possibility of trusting an institution. In Hardin’s model, trust is
intelligible only when A trusts B to do (or in relation to) x. The variable x
must be a definite action or purpose which A expects B to do because B has
a reason to do so that is grounded in A (Hardin 26). As such, individuals can
genuinely trust only when they have enough information that allows them to
know the potential trusted actor’s motivations towards the trusting individual
(Hardin 24). This means that there are specific cognitive conditions that need
to be met in order for one to trust someone or something. Consequently, the
complexity and opacity surrounding the interests of modern state institutions
leads theorists advocating for encapsulated trust to conclude that it does
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not make sense to trust institutions.1 For example, a citizen (A) should trust
Congress (B) to include the public option in the healthcare bill (x) if and only
if she has enough information to expect that the motivations of congressmen
and congresswomen align with her preferences towards the public option.
This type of trust is impossible on two grounds. On one hand, it is incredibly
costly – if not impossible – to obtain such information. On the other hand,
the nature of democratic systems hinders the possibility of high trust in state
institutions because of the variety of preferences and motivations to which
these institutions would have to align themselves. As a result, the theory of
encapsulated trust deems trust in state institutions as nonsensical because
the conditions for trust cannot be met.
The literature points to material well-being as the causal factor that
modifies people’s cognitive conditions regarding trust. In other words,
citizens are refining their conditions for trusting others as their material
well-being increases. Specifically, Ronald Inglehart argues that trust in
government institutions decreases when people surpass a materialist stage
and become Post-materialists (Inglehart 299, 1997). In other words, people’s
conditions for trusting institutions become more sophisticated once their
level of material well-being has an effect on their value-system.2 A Materialist
emphasizes economic and physical security, while a Post-materialist
emphasizes autonomy and self-expression (Inglehart 135, 2008). Although
it is hard to determine when a country’s value-system changes, testing the
effect that material well-being has on institutional trust may prove to be
quite insightful. In particular, if the effect is negative, this would support the
adoption of post-materialist values in a country. In terms of democracy, it is
clear that post-materialist values, including autonomy and self-expression,
would provide a healthier democratic society. However, increasing material
well-being does not always change the value-system of a country since
the latter is highly determined by culture. Nevertheless, since a decrease
in institutional trust may suggest that post-materialist values are being
internalized, such a fall could be seen favorably in some cases.
Functional Argument
The functional argument claims that low trust in state institutions is
an unfavorable condition for democracy. Unlike the notion of encapsulated
trust, the theories that support this argument state that it makes sense for
people to trust certain institutions. The conditions for institutional trust are
made possible by the fact that the constitutive norm for which an institution
stands is intelligible to the members of society. Moreover, these theories
explain declining trust in state institutions as a result of the inability of
these organizations to recur to their constitutive norm. Therefore, their
performance in terms of their normative function is the determining factor
for changes in institutional trust (hence the functional argument).3 As such,
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a decline in trust in state institutions implies suboptimal performance of a
democracy’s state institutions.
Whereas supporters of encapsulated trust claim that the conditions
to trust state institutions can never be fulfilled, other theorists believe that
institutions in general can be trusted. Claus Offe’s defense of institutional
trust aims at explaining how people can trust institutions and discusses
why citizens will trust some institutions and not others. Obtaining enough
information on the preferences and intentions of an institution is not a
necessary condition for institutional trust, but rather one must know the
“repertoire of meaning and justification” that is produced by the institution
in order to trust it (Offe 71). For example, people can trust their bank because
the basic idea for which the institution stands is intelligible to them. The
condition that determines whether the bank is trusted depends on whether
the institution is structured in such a way that it complies with the idea for
which it stands. As opposed to Hardin, Offe believes that institutions can be
trusted when they merit such trust.4
This defense of institutional trust assumes that institutional
frameworks shape people’s behavior. In other words, if an institution
is structured so as to recur to its “constitutive norms”, individuals have
reason to expect that strangers within this institutional regime will express
predictable patterns of behavior that concur with the meaning inherent to the
institution (Warren 7). Unfortunately, members of society cannot determine
whether an institution is properly structured. They can, however, observe the
performance record of an institution. In the specific case of state institutions,
individuals may be more aware of the institutions’ performance since it
directly affects the lives of all citizens given their all-encompassing functions.
As Charles Tilly argues, “integration of trust networks into public politics
operates… incrementally in response to governmental performance” (Tilly
22). Consequently, this functional argument implies that trust in institutions
can be generated. The most obvious way of achieving this is to have a
flawless record of maintaining the institution’s constitutive norm. Finally,
the functional argument has a clear stance on the debate regarding the
relation between trust in state institutions and democracy. Since a decrease
in institutional trust suggests poor institutional performance, a democracy
that is experiencing a decline in trust in state institutions is not functioning
correctly.
Security Argument
It is unclear whether the security argument claims that low trust
in state institutions is an unfavorable condition for a democracy. This is
because this argument is supported by theories on generalized trust rather
than institutional trust. The theories presented here have both rational and
psychological aspects. Nonetheless, the common determinant for declining
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generalized trust is pessimistic economic outlooks from people in society. In
other words, when people are afraid of their present and future economic
prospects, they trust others less (hence the security argument). Moreover – as
elaborated later on – the corrosion of generalized trust hinders the capacity
of individuals to fight for common ends, crippling civil society and allowing
corrupt government to arise (Warren 12). Therefore, the effect that declining
trust in state institutions has on democracy will depend on whether this type
of trust is included in or excluded from the broader notion of generalized
trust.
The definition of trust used in this paper emphasizes the fact that trust
always involves the risk of being harmed by the agent trusted in exchange
for obtaining the benefits of cooperation. Thus, the decision to trust (or not to
trust) can be treated as a choice made under uncertainty for which a rational
choice approach would be appropriate. Under this framework, people tend
to be characterized as risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving. The rational
security argument states that people who enjoy greater economic security
tend to be more risk loving when it comes to trusting others, while those that
lack this security are more risk averse (Inglehart 89). This difference stems
from the fact that a person on shaky economic grounds cannot afford to take
the risk of trusting a stranger because if the trusted agent defects on the actions
that are expected of him, the trusting individual loses more relative to what
an economically secure trusting individual would lose. This argument can
also be seen from a psychological lens. Eric Uslaner argues that dispositions
to optimism and pessimism, which are highly reflected in economic security,
produce the differences in the willingness to trust strangers (Uslaner 139).
Therefore, trust is not only determined by economic status, but also by the
context in which trust decisions are made. In other words, even a rich person
will be less likely to trust others when the future seems dire, such as during
a global economic crisis.
The security argument concerns a broader notion of trust than the
arguments presented in the previous sections. The trust explained here
applies not only to institutions, but to anything that would not be trusted
because of informal links, including family or group ties.5 In other words, the
security argument deals with trust conferred to things or people with whom
the trusting individual has had no previously established relationships. This
trust in strangers and distant institutions has been defined by the literature
as generalized trust. On the other hand, trust in acquaintances and kin is
considered particularized trust (Warren 9). The social capital literature is
heavily invested in generalized trust because it enhances the capability of
building social capital. According to Robert Putnam, social capital includes
“features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”
(Putnam 167).6 Since trust in strangers and distant institutions eases the
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creation of networks that help solve coordination problems, generalized
trust is a crucial factor in social capital. Whether trust in state institutions
should be considered a part of generalized trust is a contentious issue that
will be touched upon in the next section.
In short, the security argument states that generalized trust declines
when the economic outlooks from people in society become more pessimistic.
Given the positive view that the social capital literature has of generalized
trust, a decline in this type of trust is unfavorable for a democracy. In other
word, decreasing generalized trust entails a decrease in social capital,
which can curtail economic efficiency and civic engagement. As such,
the recommendations of this argument would include a stable economic
environment and the provision of resources that would increase the people’s
sense of economic security, including social safety nets. The following section
discusses whether generalized trust encompasses trust in state institutions.
Generalized Trust and Trust in State Institutions
The three arguments that have been presented to explain changes in
institutional trust are summarized in the table below. These arguments are
not exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
Type of Trust

Decrease in Trust in State
Institutions

Recommendation for
Democracy

Materialist
Argument
(Ronald Inglehart
and Orlando
Patterson)

Institutional trust

Sometimes favorable
since this may indicate
that a country has
internalized postmaterialist values

Improve the material
well-being of people
in society

Functional
Argument
(Claus Offe and
Jean Cohen)

Institutional trust

Unfavorable since this
indicates poor democratic
performance

Improve institutions
so that they recur
to their constitutive
norm

Unfavorable if trust
in state institutions is
included in generalized
trust

Provide a stable
economic
environment and
resources that
increase people’s
sense of economic
security (e.g. social
safety nets)

Security
Generalized trust
Argument
(Ronald Inglehart,
Claus Offe, and
Eric Uslaner)

Uncertain if trust in state
institutions is excluded
from generalized trust

The question of including trust in state institutions as a part of
generalized trust arises as a result of the lack of mutual exclusiveness in the
arguments. Both Claus Offe and Ronald Inglehart – advocates of conflicting
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views regarding trust in state institutions – are supporters of the security
argument (Warren 11).7 They agree that the economic dispositions of optimism
or pessimism play a role regarding generalized trust. Moreover, both
concur that more generalized trust is a good thing for democratic societies.
Given that Inglehart deems a decreasing generalized trust as unfavorable
and a decreasing trust in state institutions as favorable in some cases, he is
implicitly excluding institutional trust from the more encompassing notion
of generalized trust. This suggests that his vision of a prosperous society
entails a discriminating trust in political institutions coupled with strong
generalized trust. On the other hand, Offe’s view regarding these two notions
of trust does not generate any conflict. Thus, it can be implied that there is
no need for any division and that generalized trust encompasses the notion
of institutional trust. In this last case, a decline in trust in state institutions
will always be regarded as unfavorable because it implies a decrease in
generalized trust, which promotes the creation of social capital. The same
judgment is unclear in the exclusionary case because theorist may still view
trust in state institutions as positive for democracies on its own accord.
This inclusion vs. exclusion debate of trust in state institutions
and generalized trust contains other mixed stances. Not all advocates of
the materialist argument support exclusion and not all advocates of the
functional argument support inclusion. For example, Jean Cohen supports
the functional argument, but avoids including trust in state institutions as part
of generalized trust. He argues that strong institutions are essential to social
capital building (Cohen 222). Cohen believes that strong political and legal
institutions provide the necessary conditions for creating social trust. Rather
than generalized trust encompassing trust in state institutions, the latter is
independent and promotes the former. On the other hand, the materialist
argument postulated by Orlando Patterson argues for a causal mechanism
linking socioeconomic status to both generalized trust and trust in political
institutions. He suggests that greater affluence allows for a more reasonable
perception of the effectiveness in politics, “which reinforces generalized
trust, political trust, and the tendency to become more politically active”
(Patterson 196). Therefore, this materialist argument views institutional trust
as being in harmony with generalized trust.
To summarize, the literature points to three arguments for explaining
changes in trust. Two of these – the materialist and the functional argument
– stand in direct contrast regarding trust in state institutions. The former
maintains material well-being as the catalyst for change and views a decline
in trust in state institutions as favorable for democracy in some cases. The
latter focuses on the performance of institutions as the basis of change and
regards a decline in trust in state institutions as unfavorable for democracy.
The third is the security argument and it refers to generalized trust rather than
institutional trust. The cause of change in this argument is the disposition to
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economic optimism or pessimism in society. This argument provides no clear
normative judgment on a decline in trust in state institutions. The inclusion
of trust in state institutions in the notion of generalized trust implies that a
decline would be unfavorable. This is because there is a broad consensus
in the social capital literature that generalized trust is a crucial factor for
building social capital. However, the exclusion of trust in state institutions
does not necessarily imply a favorable view of a decline in this type of trust.
Finally, these views on exclusion and inclusion are not divided according to
materialist vs. functional lines. The following section postulates hypotheses
that stem from these theories in order to test them in the specific case of
Mexico.
Hypotheses
Based on the literature review, the following hypotheses for
explaining changes in trust in Mexican state institutions arise:
1.
		
2.
		
		
3.
		

Increasing indicators of material well-being lead to decreasing 		
trust in state institutions, and vice-versa
Events that mark the failure of state institutions to perform 		
according to their proper function lead to decreasing trust in 		
state institutions, and vice-versa.
Decreasing indicators of economic security lead to decreasing 		
trust in state institutions, and vice-versa.

The first hypothesis stems from a naïve version of the materialist
argument. The causal mechanism starts with an increase in material wellbeing in Mexico, as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the
Human Development Index (HDI). With this economic development taking
place, the value-system in Mexico shifts gradually away from materialism and
towards postmaterialism.8 Consequently, Mexicans internalize autonomy as
a core value and thusly refine their conditions for trusting state institutions.
Assuming the notion of encapsulated trust, Mexicans will realize that it is
ridiculous to trust in something whose interests are opaque. Therefore, trust
in state institutions declines as material well-being increases.
From explaining the causal mechanism of this first hypothesis, it is
possible to identify two weaknesses. Firstly, it is unclear whether an increase
in GDP or HDI actually improves the material well-being of all Mexicans.
This is even true for per capita measurements since most of the wealth
may be concentrated in a small percentage of the population. Nonetheless,
these two indicators continue to be the common proxies for economic
development. Secondly, even assuming that the material well-being of
everyone increases with GDP or HDI, it is not certain that Mexican citizens
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become Post-materialists as a result (see footnote 8). This is especially the
case of historically Catholic countries such as Mexico, where it is harder for
values such as autonomy and self-expression to take hold (Inglehart 217,
1997).9 Nevertheless, it is impossible to test for cultural variations and valuesystem shifts when dealing with only one case. As such, the first hypothesis
rests solely on the notion that people refine their conditions for trust as GDP
increases – regardless of changes in values. Because values of autonomy and
self-expression are not necessarily internalized, even if this hypothesis is
proven correct, it is inconclusive in providing evidence for the argument that
low levels of trust in state institutions are good for democracy.
The second hypothesis is based on the functional argument. The
causal mechanism starts with an event that proves to citizens that a Mexican
state institution is not performing according to its prescribed function. Given
that the state institution is not recurring to its constitutive norm, Mexican
citizens would realize that the institution cannot be trusted. In other words,
the fact that the institution defected from what it is supposed to do means
that the institution is not structured so as to align the motivation and interests
of its members with its goal. Since the structure of the institution is flawed,
Mexican citizens will fear other future defections that may hurt them and
will therefore not risk trusting the state institution.
This hypothesis implies that it is possible to improve trust in state
institutions by undergoing structural reforms. However, the cause of
the failure of an institution to recur to its constitutive norm is not always
structural. There may be exogenous factors such as embedded corruption in
society or chronic violence that may prevent the state institution from fulfilling
its duty. Given that these factors are more common in developing countries
that in developed countries, this hypothesis would imply that there is higher
volatility of trust in the former. Either way, any action that may increase
institutional trust would be recommended primarily because low levels of
trust in state institutions are viewed unfavorably by the theories supporting
this hypothesis. In other words, since improving the poor performance of
state institutions is good for democracy, means of action such as enacting
structural reforms, controlling embedded corruption, and fighting chronic
violence would be recommended.
The third hypothesis reflects the ideas of the security argument – or
the encompassing security argument to be more precise. This specification lies
in the fact that the hypothesis works under the assumption that generalized
trust encompasses trust in state institutions. The causal mechanism starts
with a change towards a more negative attitude in society about economic
security, which can be measured by indicators like the Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI). This means that Mexican citizens become more risk averse
when it comes to trusting strangers or distant institutions. More specifically,
the Mexican people fear for their own economic prospects and therefore
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avoid the risk of losing more by trusting a state institution. Finally, because
this hypothesis assumes that trust in state institutions is encompassed by
generalized trust, if this hypothesis is proven correct, it would imply that
low levels of trust in state institutions are bad for democracy. This is mainly
because social capital would decrease as a result.
To summarize, the three hypotheses are not precisely the same as
those stated by the arguments derived in the literature. The first hypothesis is
based on a naïve notion of the materialist argument and the third hypothesis
assumes that trust in state institutions is included in the notion of generalized
trust. These limitations stem primarily from issues related to the feasibility
of testing unobservable factors. Nevertheless, the second hypothesis follows
the functional argument quite closely. The following section explains the
methodology carried out to test these three hypotheses. It also justifies the
selection of certain data over others. Finally, the meaning and source of the
data used are clarified in order to lay down the implications and limitations
of the results obtained.
Methodology
Institutional Trust Data
The data on institutional trust comes from the nonpartisan,
independent public opinion research center Consulta Mitofsky. The survey
samples are representative of the Mexican population.10 These surveys were
held sporadically from April 2004 up until November 2007, after which the
survey was carried out on a monthly basis. The total amount of observations
per institutions is 41, which is sufficient for observing trends in the data.
The question regarding institutional trust asks: How much trust
do you have in the following institution? After which a list of institutions is
presented and the respondents are given the option to answer using a scale
that ranges from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest). After this information is collected,
the arithmetic mean for each month is provided as the resulting trust in the
given institution. Consulta Mitofsky considers a ranking from 8 to 10 to be
high, between 6 and 7.9 to be medium, and from 0 to 5.9 to be low. The use
of this particular public opinion data stems from the fact that it is the only
publicly available data on institutional trust in Mexico that spans over more
than 4 years and includes a variety of the country’s institutions.
The institutions selected for this paper can be divided into three
categories: state institutions, state-related institutions, and non-state
institutions. The reason for selecting more than just state institutions is to
evaluate whether there are differences between these categories that would
make the case of state institutions more noteworthy. The state institutions
selected are the President, Senators, Deputies,11 the Supreme Court, the
Army, and the Police. State-related institutions include the Federal Electoral
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Institute (IFE)12 and the Political Parties. Business and the Media constitute
the last category. All the available data on trust in these institutions were
inserted into the statistical analysis program EViews. This institutional trust
dataset is the basis for testing the three hypotheses proposed in the previous
section.
First and Third Hypotheses: Regression Model
The method for testing the first and third hypothesis was an OLS
linear regression model. The reason for not including the second hypothesis
in this analysis is because it is impossible to measure events that mark the
proper or improper performance of institutions through time. On the other
hand, the first and third hypotheses deal with measurable phenomena.
Firstly, material-well being can be measured through GDP, HDI, and
other indicators. This study uses GDP because it is the available indicator with
the highest frequency (quarterly data). At most, the other indicators were
available on a yearly basis. Such lack of data points would have weakened
the analysis, given that the monthly institutional trust data only spans from
April 2004 to January 2011 with many gaps in the first months. Secondly,
perceptions of economic security can be measured through the Consumer
Confidence Index (CCI). The CCI is comprised of five partial indicators: two
relate to the current and expected economic situation of the household, the
other two attend the current and expected economic situation of the country,
and the fifth reflects the willingness of people to buy durable goods at the
present time. This indicator is estimated by the Mexican central bank (Banco
de México) and the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI)
based on the results of a national survey.13 Fortunately, the frequency of
this data is monthly. The datasets ranging from April 2004 to January 2011
for both GDP and CCI were inserted into EViews,14 and the following OLS
regression was run for each institution (i):

!"#$!!" = ! + !! !"#! + !! !!"! + !! 	
  

There is no issue with multicollinearity in this regression because
CCI and GDP are not highly correlated. In fact, the correlation between
these independent variables is -0.13, which is quite small and surprisingly
negative.15
According to the first hypothesis (or the naïve materialist argument),
the coefficient for GDP (ß1) should be negative and significant for trust in
state institutions. This is because increasing material well-being is expected
to refine the conditions for trusting institutions. On the other hand, the third
hypothesis (or the encompassing security argument) expects the coefficient
for CCI (ß2) to be positive and significant, given that a decrease in economic
security makes people more risk averse in terms of trust.
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Second Hypothesis: Piecewise-Trend-Break
The method for testing the second hypothesis is more complicated
than a simple OLS linear regression. This method involves selecting a
simplified model that best describes the data in order to view changes in
trend. Changes in the trend for trust in institutions can then be coupled
with events regarding the proper or improper performance of institutions’
respective functions. I call the method proposed here “piecewise-trendbreak.”
For selecting the most appropriate model, the trust data for each
institution was analyzed as a whole. Linear and quadratic trend models were
fitted onto every institution’s trust data. For reasons specific to the nature of
the data, there was no evidence for the possibility of an exponential trend
or for any seasonal or cyclical variations. Afterwards, the model with the
lowest Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) was selected.16 If the trend that
fits the data best revealed no change in the direction of trust (i.e. increasing
vs. decreasing), no additional steps were taken. This is always the case with
linear models, but only occasionally for quadratic models. If the data followed
a quadratic trend that showed a change in the direction of trust, the data was
broken into no more than two subsamples. In other words, when the fitted
trends looked like an inverted U, the maximum was used as the point for
dividing the data. Finally, for those institutions where a separation of the
sample was necessary, the first and the second step were repeated on each
subsample until the entire sample data for each institution was modeled in a
piecewise fashion.
This methodology was selected because it allowed for a reasonable,
non-idiosyncratic way of analyzing changes in institutional trust. The inherent
smooth curve of the quadratic model is appropriate for forecasting purposes
since it takes into account the entire sample in a single model. However,
the objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of changes in trust
in state institutions, not to forecast their future levels. Therefore, it is more
reasonable to identify places where the trend breaks. Curves cannot identify
these ruptures, but lines can. On the other hand, it would not make sense
to analyze every single change in trust that occurs from one observation to
the next despite the fact that these are linear. Short-term variations are most
likely random and are reflected in the non-zero variance of the sample. Most
importantly, an attempt to explain these changes would require utilizing
many historical idiosyncrasies. Such an idiosyncratic approach loses
analytical power in a manner analogous to data mining: the model fits the
noise instead of the signal.
In the end, the objective is to find those linear breaks that cause more
than short-term change. In other words, the dates in which the signs of the
coefficients in linear trends change indicate a variation in the medium-term
trend in institutional trust. Admittedly, this methodology only accounts
90

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Lorenzo Felipe Lagos
for changes in the direction of the trend in institutional trust – increasing,
decreasing, or plateau – and exclude changes in intensity. Nevertheless, this
information is sufficient for shedding light on the plausibility of the second
hypothesis (or the functional argument). According to this hypothesis,
there must be a significant event at every trend break such that if the event
demonstrates that the institution is not recurring to its constitutive norm, the
trend becomes negative, and vice-versa.
Data Description
Regression Model
The coefficients, their respective significance levels, and the
R-squared of the regression ran on each institution are summarized in the
following table:
INSTITUTION
t

GDP
ß1

CCI
ß2

R-SQUARED
R2

President

0.302724*** (+)

-0.002437

0.221662 (22%)

Senators

0.455490*** (+)

-0.008111* (–)

0.395194 (40%)

Deputies

0.573082*** (+)

-0.003211

0.334416 (33%)

Supreme Court

0.465727*** (+)

-0.014616*** (–)

0.625113 (63%)

Army

0.131636** (+)

0.001496

0.099076 (10%)

Police

0.424061*** (+)

-0.003175

0.285021 (28%)

Political Parties

0.109534

-0.008032* (–)

0.082288 (8%)

IFE

0.062633

0.003139* (+)

0.084488 (8%)

Business

0.734690*** (+)

-0.015732*** (–)

0.622258 (62%)

Media

0.324301*** (+)

-0.005730** (–)

0.475550 (48%)

STATE

STATE-RELATED

NON-STATE

* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance
The coefficient for GDP is positive and highly significant for all state
and non-state institutions. The GDP dataset is measured in trillions of pesos,
which is approximately tens of billions of dollars. In Mexico, this data is in
billones de pesos.17 Therefore, an increase of approximately ten billion dollars
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in Mexican GDP leads to a 0.30 increase in trust in the President; 0.46 for
Senators; 0.57 in Deputies; 0.47 in the Supreme Court; 0.13 in the Army; 0.42
in the Police; 0.73 in Business; and 0.32 in the Media. In the case of staterelated institutions, the coefficients for trust in the Political Parties and the
IFE were also positive but not significant.
The results of the CCI are mixed. For non-state institutions, the
coefficient for CCI is negative and highly significant. For state-related
institutions, the coefficient is significant but positive in the case of the IFE
and negative for Political Parties. For state institutions, the coefficient is
negative for both Senators and the Supreme Court, but has high significance
only in the latter. Lastly, the other state institutions have a non-significant,
negative coefficient for CCI, except for the Army, whose coefficient is positive.
Moreover, it is hard to conceptualize exactly what a one-point change in the
CCI means in concrete terms since it is meant to give economists an idea of
how confidence in the economy has changed relative to other times.
In order to put into context how much the CCI changes from safe
times to unsafe times, it is helpful to look at the maximum and the minimum
of the dataset. The maximum occurs in March 2006 with a value of 112.55,
while the minimum takes place in October 2009 with a value of 76.95.
Therefore, CCI drops approximately 35.6 points from the economically
most secure to the economically least secure period in the sample, making
a one-point drop equivalent to 2.8% of the change. Consequently, dividing
the coefficients by 0.028 reveals the effect of CCI on institutional trust when
drastic changes in the perceptions of economic security occur. In other words,
when perceptions of economic security change from extremely positive to
extremely negative, trust in the Senators increases by 0.29; in the Supreme
Court by 0.52; in the Political Parties by 0.29; in Business by 0.56; and in the
Media by 0.20. Finally, trust in the IFE decreases by 0.11 when such a drastic
decrease in the perceptions of economic security takes place.
The R-squared indicates what percentage of the variance in the
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. In other
words, it reveals how much CCI and GDP explain trust in institution i.
Normally, a good R-squared is above 80%. However, the dependent variable
studied in this paper is not a typical economic variable. There are many nonmeasurable factors that could affect institutional trust. Moreover, given that
only two independent variables are included, it would be quite impressive if
these explained at least a third of the variation in institutional trust.
The R-squared values of the regressions are quite consistent. Nonstate institutions hold high R-squared values, and so do three out of the six
state institutions. The other three state institutions have decent R-squared
values, while the state-related institutions score the lowest of all. The
following table will help clarify the former:

92

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Lorenzo Felipe Lagos
High
R2 ≥ 0.33

Medium
0.33 > R2 ≥ 0.10

Low
R2 < 0.10

Supreme Court (63%)

Police (28%)

Political Parties (8%)

Business (62%)

President (22%)

IFE (8%)

Media (48%)

Army (10%)

Senators (40%)
Deputies (33%)

It is unclear what other measurable independent variables exist that
could contribute to institutional trust. Nevertheless, this is a powerful model
because only two independent variables lead to relatively decent R-squared
values in most of the cases.
Piecewise-Trend-Break
The graphs of the piecewise-trend-break method are located in
Appendix E. All institutions begin with increasing linear or quadratic
trends. Afterwards, the trust data stabilizes in a smaller range. This increase
and stabilization in institutional trust is also clearly visible in the rough
data graph on all institutions located in Appendix F. When these initially
increasing trends end, there are three different options that may ensue: a
drop followed by another increasing trend, a plateau, or a decreasing trend;
a simple plateau; or a switch in trend. The defining characteristic of a drop is
that the difference between the value previous to the break and the value that
follows it is greater than 0.30. This helps to differentiate between the drop
followed by a plateau and the simple plateau.
The months where the trend-breaks occur are coupled with relevant
political events taking place on those same dates in order to see if a reputation
problem may account for these changes. The summary of the results are
stated concisely in the following table:
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Date

Institution

Change in Trust

May 06-Jun 06 Pre-election criticism: media
criticized for biased election
coverage

Media

Drop: 7.65 to 7.17
(0.48)

Jun 06-Aug 06 Election controversy:
allegations of electoral fraud

IFE

Drop: 7.54 to 7.10
(0.44)

Senators

Drop: 6.26 to 5.52
(0.74),
Drop: 6.12 to 5.73
(0.39),
Drop: 6.35 to 5.74
(0.61)

Aug 06-Sep06

Event

Election controversy
resolved: no total recount
awarded, Calderón wins the
presidency

Deputies
Political Parties

Feb 07-Mar07

Dec 08-Jan09

Security problems: Army
deployed in Northern
states, corruption of Police
emphasized
n/a

Army
Police

Trend: 0.02 to -0.01
(-0.03)
Drop: 6.53 to 5.85
(0.68)

Senators

Plateau: 6.04

Business

Plateau: 6.87

Media

Plateau:7.55

Feb 09-Mar09

n/a

Supreme Court

Plateau: 6.94

Jul 09-Aug09

Elections: midterm elections
results given

Political Parties

Drop: 6.08 to 5.75
(0.33)

Sep 09-Nov09

n/a

President

Plateau: 6.72

The relevant events corresponded only to times when trust in the institution
dropped or the trend switched sign. The following section analyzes the data
presented and delves into the details of the events in the table in order to
evaluate how they could have affected institutional trust.
Data Analysis
Developing Countries and the Materialist Argument
The regressions provide convincing evidence against the first
hypothesis. The precise opposite of the materialist argument’s prediction
occurred: increasing material well-being increased trust in state institutions,
and vice-versa. The most obvious explanation for the collapse of this
first hypothesis is that it is based on a naïve version of the materialist
argument. Inglehart would point to cultural factors as the reason why
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economic development in Mexico may not necessarily lead to a change in
the country’s value system and consequently refine people’s conditions for
trust (see footnote 8). But upon closer inspection, there may be a quite simple
explanation for these results.
Despite being a member of the OECD, Mexico is still in many ways
a developing country. As such, the starting point for material well-being is
much lower than in developed countries. Assuming that the material wellbeing of everyone increases with GDP, a national government’s successful
economic strategy would imply that the majority of people escape poverty.
In this case, people may still rely heavily on the government for maintaining
their newly achieved economic status. Consequently, their conditions for
trusting institutions are not refined and people become more confident in
the institutions they view as responsible for their material improvements.
Moreover, the people would be thankful to the government and trust it for
bringing them out of such dire conditions. However, this may not be the
case in developed countries, where the majority of the population would
move up from the middle class as material well-being increases. Indeed, the
analysis presented here only contains evidence for the case of developing
countries. Therefore – in developing countries such as Mexico – increasing
indicators of material well-being lead to increasing trust in state institutions,
and vice-versa. A closer look at the results from the regressions provides
stronger support for this refined version of the first hypothesis.
All state institutions and non-state institutions have positive and
significant coefficients for GDP, while state-related institutions only lack the
significance. This evidence suggests that the state-related institutions included
in the analysis are not viewed by Mexican citizens as being important factors
in changing material well-being. The IFE organizes elections and the Political
Parties participate in them. As the economic conditions of the country
improve, it is unlikely that Mexicans will rely more on the IFE or the Political
Parties. Even though political actors that enact economic change come from
some party line and their electoral victories are decided by the IFE, these
state-related institutions are not viewed by citizens as key economic players.
On the other hand, the non-state institutions included in the analysis clearly
contribute to GDP growth. Business is an obvious contributor to the economic
prosperity of the country. It is the only institution that is significantly
correlated to GDP data (0.70) and its coefficient for GDP is the largest out
of all the institutions (0.73). Also, the Media in Mexico is dominated by
big business. This is particularly clear in television, where two companies,
Televisa and TV Azteca, control almost 100% of the Mexican TV broadcasting
market. The owners of these media networks, Emilio Azcárraga and Ricardo
Salinas Pliego respectively, are powerful members of the Mexican business
community. Another piece of evidence that suggests the tight relationship
between business and the Mexican media is that the correlation in trust
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between these two institutions is remarkably high and positive (0.87).
If the public’s view of an institution as a contributor to economic
prosperity determines whether their institutional trust positively depends on
GDP, certain doubts exists regarding the results for some state institutions.
While the President, the Senators, and the Deputies enact reforms to improve
the country’s economy, the Supreme Court, the Army, and the Police do not
directly contribute to the economy. The first deals with judicial matters,
while the last two focus on security issues. The only defense for these
results is that reliance on all state institutions increases as the country is
developing. A more prosperous country requires a solid judicial system and
a safe environment. Thus, when material well-being increases in developing
countries, people confer more trust upon those institutions that will further
this development. As for the case of the IFE and the Political Parties, it is
unclear whether prosperity is directly linked to electoral matters. Therefore,
one of two conditions must be satisfied in order for an institution’s trust
to increase as material well-being increases in a developing country: 1) the
institution is a state institution; or 2) the public views this institution as a
main contributor to economic prosperity.
Economic Security
The regressions also provide evidence against the third hypothesis:
decreasing indicators of economic security lead to decreasing trust in none of
the state institutions. The coefficient for CCI was only positive for the Army,
but it was not significant. In all the other state institutions, the coefficient was
negative and only significant for the Senators and the Supreme Court. Thus,
trust in these two institutions decreases as perceptions of economic security
increase. This is suggestive evidence against the assertion that people
become more risk averse in trusting a state institution as their economic
safety weakens. Moreover, these mixed results might be a reflection of the
fact that this hypothesis is based on the encompassing security argument. In
other words, the third hypothesis is derived from an argument that assumes
trust in state institutions is included in generalized trust. Given that the
coefficients for all state institutions were not the same sign may indicate that
trust in state institutions is not necessarily a category that is encompassed by
generalized trust. Instead, each state institution may have its own merits for
being included or excluded from this broader category. A closer analysis of
the results from all the regressions provides further insights to the previous
arguments.
All the state-related and non-state institutions have significant
coefficients for CCI and all of them are negative, except for trust in the
IFE which is positive and significant. Indeed, the case of the IFE is special,
probably because of its autonomy. It is the only institution whose trust is
not significantly correlated to that of any other institution. Trust in the IFE is
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also small when extreme changes in economic security perception take place
(0.11). On the other hand, trust in Business attains the greatest effect (0.56),
while the Supreme Court follows closely in second (0.52). This may seem
counterintuitive: why would a person whose economic safety is at stake trust
Business, the Media, Political Parties, and the Supreme Court more, but at
the same time trust the IFE less?
There are two possible answers to this question. The first possible
answer is that people who fear they might lose everything will want to gain
protection from some state institutions and political parties, secure jobs
from non-state institutions, and ensure favorable results in elections. For
example, a person will confer more trust to Business and the Media when the
economic future is uncertain because these are primary actors in ensuring
that jobs in the economy are created. Moreover, trust in Political Parties,
the Supreme Court, and the Senators also increases as this person seeks
political protection. Finally, this person also holds certain beliefs about how
his favorable economic situation could be maintained, and therefore will not
trust the IFE in fear that the will of the people does not coincide with his/
her preferences. Nevertheless, this explanation is quite a stretch and there is
not enough evidence to support it. It does not explain why the coefficients
of trust in other state institutions are not significant. Moreover, it contradicts
the previous section’s explanation that maintained that the IFE and Political
Parties are not linked to economic prosperity. The second possible answer
to these results pertains to the inclusion vs. exclusion debate between trust
in state institutions and generalized trust. Since the IFE organizes elections,
it supports relationships among people as democratic citizens. As such, the
IFE is an institution that creates trust among strangers, which is precisely
the definition of generalized trust. Given that the original security argument
addresses generalized trust, it is reasonable for the regression on trust in the
IFE to support this argument. Nonetheless, this second explanation does not
clarify why trust in Business, the Media, Political Parties, and the Supreme
Court have negative coefficients for CCI. In the end, although it is certain
that the evidence presented here does not support the encompassing security
argument, the results are too mixed to ascertain which other argument they
would support.
The previous analysis may cast doubts on the validity of the
regressions as a whole. Yet while the regressions have their limitations, they
still maintain strong explanatory power. One clear limitation is that the data
spans around 7 years, making it impossible to make long-term analyses.
Even though this might have affected the results regarding CCI, the fact
that the results for GDP are remarkably consistent strengthens the support
for the refined version of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, the R-squared
values of the regressions are not ideal, meaning that many other factors
affect institutional trust. Nonetheless, none of the state institutions fall under
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the “low R2 ” category. Indeed, those in the middle category are the state
institutions in charge of security issues and the President – institutions with
high political visibility whose trust is consequently affected by more factors
than GDP and CCI. The converse argument applies to the Supreme Court.
Given its low political visibility, fewer factors affect the trust that society
confers upon this state institution, leading to the highest R-squared value
when only GDP and CCI are included in the regression. Finally, even though
the regression analysis has not illustrated all the factors that affect trust in
state institution, the evidence sheds light on the validity of two possible
determinants of institutional trust found in the literature. Therefore, the case
study of Mexico supports the idea that increases in material well-being lead
to increases in trust in state institutions and that changes in perceptions of
economic security have mixed results.
Democratization and Reputation
The general graph of institutional trust in Mexico shows that trust
increases considerably from April 2004 until around mid-2006, where the
values stabilize within a small range.18 A possible reason for seeing such
trends in trust in state institutions may be due to Mexico’s democratizing
process. After almost 70 years of single-party rule by the Revolutionary
Institutional Party (PRI), Vicente Fox from the opposing National Action
Party (PAN) was elected president in 2000. The democratic transition was
gradual and built up from the local level: it moved from municipalities to
states, to the chambers of Congress, and finally to the presidency (De Remes
177). Fox’s election may have caused Mexican citizens to begin to trust these
state institutions more. The promise of political inclusion of every citizen
and accountability by the government might well account for the increasing
trend. However, this is simply speculation, especially since there is no point
of comparison given that trust in state-related and non-state institutions also
experienced the same increase during this period. Moreover, it is unclear
what caused the stabilization of trust within a small range somewhere around
mid-2006. On one hand, some may argue that Mexico’s democratization
took a step backwards in the 2006 presidential elections. After an extremely
tight race, Felipe Calderón from the right-leaning PAN beat Andrés Manuel
López Obrador from the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD) with 35.89% of the popular vote against 35.33%. Mr. Obrador and
his followers demanded a total recount and laid claims of electoral fraud.
Although this matter is still murky, those who believe that fraud occurred
have good reason to stop trusting state institutions. On the other hand, trust
in state institutions cannot increase forever. It is only logical that the initially
increasing trends stabilized after some time. This view is further supported
by the fact that state-related and non-state institutions also stabilized within
a smaller range around the same period.
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The piecewise-trend-break method provides clearer insight into
specific political events and how these changed trust in state institutions.
Most importantly, it provides strong evidence for the second hypothesis:
events that mark the failure of state institutions to perform according to their
proper function lead to decreasing trust in state institutions, and vice-versa.
Moreover, the evidence presented by the piecewise-trend-break method also
supports this functional argument with regards to all institutions studied in
this paper – not just state institutions. In other words, when an institution
does not recur to its constitutive norm, people stop trusting it in the shortterm.
The events surrounding the July 2, 2006 presidential elections
caused decreases in trust in several institutions. In that year, trust in the
Media dropped 0.48 points from May to June, trust in the IFE dropped 0.44
points from June to July, and trust in the Senators, the Deputies, and Political
Parties dropped 0.74, 0.39, and 0.61 respectively from August to September.
Firstly, the Mexican media was heavily criticized for the amount of airtime
it gave Mr. Calderón as opposed to Mr. Obrador. An important aspect of
a trustworthy democratic system is the fair dissemination of information.
When it became clear to many that the Media was not fulfilling its democratic
responsibility, its trust fell considerably. Secondly, the IFE became the center
of attention regarding the possibility of electoral fraud and the demand for
a total recount of the votes. Given that the credibility of the IFE was put
in doubt and that its reputation was tainted through these events, Mexican
citizens reacted by trusting it less. Finally, the political actors that were
on the ground discussing and fighting for the resolution of this electoral
controversy were the Senators, the Deputies, and the Political Parties. Once
it was decided in August that no total recount would be awarded, those
who were dissatisfied with the resolution stopped conferring trust to the
institutions they depended on. Therefore, when institutions do not do as
expected, they suffer the consequences.
That data also shows that Political Parties suffer a similar fate after
every election. The piecewise-trend-break method reveals a 0.33 point drop
in trust in the Political Parties right after the July 2009 midterm elections
as well. In fact, trust in this state-related institution peaks as election time
approaches, but suffers from sharp decreases right after the electoral results
are announced. This evidence may support the converse of the second
hypothesis: as an institution performs according to its proper function,
people trust it more. According to this functional argument, these electoral
peaks occur because parties are reaching their base and building their
constituencies as they campaign. This link between the people and their
representatives tends to disappear once elections are over, especially in young
democracies. Therefore, as long as institutions perform their appropriate
function, their institutional trust increases. Another possible explanation for
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these peaks may be attributed to the visibility that Political Parties obtain
during electoral periods. However, this explanation is weakened by the
fact that other institutions that receive significant media attention during
elections, including the IFE, do not have these peaks.
The fight against international organized crime has also taken its toll
in terms of institutional trust. The slope for trust in the Army decreased by
-0.03, while trust in the Police dropped 0.68 points from February to March
2007. The Army has been one of the most trusted institutions in Mexico.19
However, its primary function in public life was to provide aid during
natural catastrophes. After President Calderón decided to take on the drug
cartels, the Army was deployed in several states – starting with Michoacán in
December 2006 – because the municipal and state police forces were deemed
too corrupt to combat the drug cartels effectively. The amount of political
capital the President invested in the Army is reflected in the fact that the trust
in the Army data is significantly correlated to that of the President (0.74). After
the initial deployment, more Army troops have been deployed and the police
forces have been reformed. Both institutions suffered for different reasons.
On one hand, the Police were already corrupt. However, it became evident
that it could not perform its function as violence escalated. This indicates
that there actually has to be a visible problem that affects public life, rather
than just a hidden structural issue, in order to see a decrease in institutional
trust. On the other hand, the Army faced the problem of a change in function.
Given the violent response of the drug cartels and the difficulty in adapting
to the duty of ensuring public security, the trend in the Army’s institutional
trust became negative. This suggests that the problem of recurring to one’s
constitutive norm is not only an issue of structure and performance, but also
a political issue since this norm can be altered by the whims of the executive
and legislative powers.
The evidence presented by the piecewise-trend-break method
certainly has its limits. Firstly, explanations for drops in institutional trust
are the only ones taken into account. Only the speculative argument for
democratic consolidation and the case of trust in Political Parties provide
evidence regarding increases in trust as institutions recur to their respective
constitutive norms. Secondly, the piecewise-trend-break method does not
account for non-events. There may be other important political events that
were ignored simply because they did not fall around the dates where breaks
in the trend occurred. Finally, the analysis only explains short-term changes
in institutional trust. In other words, the insights brought by the functional
argument may lose significance with a database that covers a longer period
of time. However, the analysis still holds value despite these limitations.
Firstly, negative events have a sharper and more defining moment for
institutional trust than do positive events. Secondly, the short-term nature
of these explanations reveals that human beings may also have a short-term
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memory in terms of institutional reputation. The case of trust in Political
Parties provides the best example for this. Finally, these explanations also
allow for the possibility of improvement through policy. By changing the
structure of an institution and fighting corruption, it is more likely that an
institution can recur to its constitutive norm. However, as the case of the
Army suggests, politicians must be careful when they seek to alter the norm
to which an institution has to recur.
Conclusion
The arguments defended by the case of Mexican state institutions are
twofold. Firstly, events that taint an institution for not performing according
to its prescribed function lead to sharp declines in trust. The evidence for
this argument is provided by the piecewise-trend-break method, which
reveals that all the dates when institutions experienced a drop in trust
match political events that mark the failure of the institution to recur to its
constitutive norm. Consequently, structural reforms that ensure institutions
recur to their constitutive norm may help increase trust in state institutions.
Nevertheless, embedded corruption and chronic violence make it harder
for some institutions to perform properly even if appropriately structured.
Furthermore, it is more probable for trust in an institution to breakdown if
constitutive norms change. This may not be a common occurrence, but the
example of the Mexican Army shows that certain institutions can experience
a shift with respect to their function. Moreover, this decline is more probable
when the capability of an institution to perform such a function is limited.
Therefore, resources that enhance capabilities are equally relevant to
institutional trust. All in all, when an institution does not perform as expected
and the public experiences the negative effects of this poor performance,
institutions suffer the consequences in terms of the trust.
The second argument supported by the case of Mexico is that GDP
growth causes an increase in trust in state institutions, and vice-versa. The
evidence for this argument is provided by the regression analysis, which
reveals that the coefficient for GDP in all the state institution regressions
is positive and highly significant. Therefore, trust in state institutions is
not all about the institutions themselves; the economy plays an important
role as well. The analysis of the results suggested that the positive effect of
GDP growth on institutional trust may only apply to developing countries
because the majority of people would be escaping poverty and consequently
relying more on the government. It would be interesting to conduct a similar
study that focuses on a developed country, in order to take into account the
differences between moving up from the middle class and escaping poverty.
As opposed to the first argument defended by the case study of Mexico, this
second argument does not apply to all institutions. Only state institutions
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and institutions that the public regards as main contributors to economic
prosperity experience such an effect. Trust in Political Parties and the IFE was
not significantly affected by changes in GDP. Finally, the regression analysis
revealed mixed results in terms of the effects of economic security concerns
on trust in state institutions. These results do not indicate that the security
argument for generalized trust should be rejected. Instead, the results
suggest that there should be more research focused on determining which
specific institutional trust should be included as a part of generalized trust.
The analysis in this paper provided some evidence for the IFE because of the
relationships it facilitates between strangers as democratic citizens. Perhaps
a cross-sectional study that pairs up institutions with similar supporting
functions would shed more light on this issue.
The arguments supported by this study also have important
implications for the debate on democracy and trust in state institutions. In
general, it seems that trust in state institutions is vital for young democracies
such as Mexico. On one hand, this study provided supporting evidence for
the functional argument, which views decreasing trust in state institutions
unfavorably since this would imply that democratic institutions are not
functioning properly. On the other hand, the case of Mexico also provides
strong evidence against the materialist argument, which views decreasing
trust in state institutions favorably because this would imply that people
have internalized post-materialist values. Instead, GDP growth leads to
increases in trust in state institutions. Therefore, democracies in developing
countries may benefit when their economies perform well.
Reflecting back on the story about the driver and Operation Cleanup,
it is clear that this paper only answers some of my initial questions. For
example, if the state institution that is meant to provide public security fails to
do so, trust in that institution will decrease. Consequently, it is worrying that
the trend for trust in the Army has become slightly negative. Nevertheless,
it remains unclear whether illegal organizations – such as the drug cartels
– that perform these function, have gained trust from the population. I find
this research topic fascinating, but it requires trust data measured at the local
level and years of field research. Fortunately, the arguments defended by
the case of Mexican state institutions provide further motivation for these
ambitious research endeavors. Most importantly, the arguments indicate the
importance of seeking high trust in state institutions and suggest the means
to do so.
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Appendix A: Institutional Trust Survey Sample Selection
Mexicans over 18 years of age that possess a voting card comprise the survey’s
population. Three samples are taken every year and the survey is repeated for
these samples every three months until the year ends. The sample selection
consists of choosing fifty out of the more than 5,000 municipalities in the
country at random. The probability of choosing a municipality is proportional
to that of its population size. For each municipality, two electoral districts are
chosen at random. Within this district, two random blocks are chosen. And
from each block, five random households are selected. Only one member of
each household is interviewed using a previously designed questionnaire.
The sample size is 1,000 in all the months that this survey has been carried
out.
TÉCNICA DE RECOLECCIÓN DE DATOS
El estudio fue llevado a cabo en viviendas particulares a través de entrevistas
“cara a cara”utilizando como herramienta de recolección de datos un cuestionario,
previamente estructurado mismo que es aplicado por personal calificado para esa
labor (el cuestionario no es de autollenado).
MÉTODO DE ESTIMACIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS
Los resultados presentados no son frecuencias simples, sino estimaciones basadas en
la utilización de factores de expansión, calculados como el inverso de la probabilidad
de selección de cada individuo en la muestra y corrección por no-respuesta en cada
sección seleccionada en muestra.
ERROR MÁXIMO Y CONFIANZA DE LAS PREGUNTAS ELECTORALES
Aunque cada porcentaje tiene su propio error asociado, el diseño de muestra
garantiza que en las estimaciones nacionales al menos 95 de cada 100 veces, el error
no sobrepasa el ±3.1 por ciento. En los estudios de opinión pública, además del error
muestral, se debe considerar que pueden existir otros errores ocasionados por el fraseo
de las preguntas y las incidencias en el trabajo de campo.
Source: http://consulta.mx/
Appendix B: Consumer Confidence Index
La Encuesta Nacional sobre la Confianza del Consumidor (ENCO) se lleva a cabo
durante los primeros veinte días de cada mes y tiene como base una muestra de
2,336 viviendas urbanas a nivel nacional, en las que se entrevista personalmente al
informante, para el cual se requiere que al menos tenga 18 años de edad. La ENCO se
recaba en 32 ciudades que comprenden a la totalidad de las entidades federativas del
país y el Nivel de Confianza de sus resultados es de 90% con un error máximo esperado
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del 15 por ciento. La información captada permite estimar el Índice de Confianza del
Consumidor, el cual está constituido tanto por la opinión que el entrevistado tiene
del presente (comparado con algún punto de referencia en el pasado) como por su
opinión de la situación futura (comparada con la presente).
Este es un índice con base igual a 100 en enero de 2003, que resulta de promediar
cinco indicadores parciales de los cuales dos hacen referencia a la situación económica
actual y esperada del hogar entrevistado, otros dos atienden a la situación económica
actual y esperada del país y el quinto índice refleja qué tan propicio consideran el
momento actual para la compra de bienes de consumo duradero. De esta manera,
cada uno de los indicadores parciales que integran el Índice de Confianza del
Consumidor resulta del promedio ponderado de los resultados expandidos de las
respuestas a cada una de las siguientes preguntas:
a) Comparada con la situación económica que los miembros de este hogar tenían hace 12
meses ¿cómo cree que es su situación en este momento?
b) ¿Cómo considera usted que será la situación económica de los miembros de este hogar
dentro de 12 meses respecto a la actual?
c) ¿Cómo considera usted la situación económica del país hoy en día comparada con la
de hace 12 meses?
d) ¿Cómo considera usted que será la condición económica del país dentro de 12 meses
respecto de la actual situación?
e) Comparando la situación económica actual con la de hace un año ¿cómo considera
en el momento actual las posibilidades de que usted o alguno de los integrantes de
este hogar realice compras tales como muebles, televisor, lavadora, otros aparatos
electrodomésticos, etcétera?
En cada una de las cuatro primeras preguntas los entrevistados tienen cinco opciones
de respuesta: mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor y mucho peor. En la quinta pregunta
las opciones son: mayores, iguales y menores. Los ponderadores utilizados para cada
opción de respuesta son los siguientes:
Opción de respuesta Ponderador
Mucho mejor o mayores 1.00
Mejor 0.75
Igual 0.50
Peor 0.25
Mucho peor o menores 0.00
Es importante destacar que la gran mayoría de las series económicas se ven afectadas
por factores estacionales. Éstos son efectos periódicos que se repiten cada año y cuyas
causas pueden considerarse ajenas a la naturaleza económica de las series, como
son las festividades, el hecho de que algunos meses tienen más días que otros, los
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periodos de vacaciones escolares, el efecto del clima en las diferentes estaciones del
año, y otras fluctuaciones estacionales como, por ejemplo, la elevada producción de
juguetes en los meses previos a la Navidad provocada por la expectativa de mayores
ventas en diciembre.
En este sentido, la desestacionalización o ajuste estacional de series económicas
consiste en remover estas influencias intra-anuales periódicas, debido a que su
presencia dificulta diagnosticar o describir el comportamiento de una serie económica
al no poder comparar adecuadamente un determinado mes con el inmediato anterior.
Analizar la serie desestacionalizada ayuda a realizar un mejor diagnóstico y pronóstico
de la evolución de la misma, ya que facilita la identificación de la posible dirección
de los movimientos que pudiera tener la variable en cuestión, en el corto plazo. Cabe
señalar que la serie desestacionalizada del Índice de Confianza del Consumidor se
calcula de manera independiente a la de sus componentes.
Source: www.banxico.org.mx/
Appendix C: Independent Variables in Regression Mod
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Appendix D: Correlations
PRESIDENT

SENATORS

DEPUTIES

SUPRCOURT

ARMY

POLICE

PRESIDENT

1.000000

0.813808

0.854844

0.747192

0.737515

0.815137

SENATORS

0.813808

1.000000

0.961632

0.899694

0.406340

0.841706

DEPUTIES

0.854844

0.961632

1.000000

0.839641

0.509069

0.852708

SUPRCOURT

0.747192

0.899694

0.839641

1.000000

0.427503

0.790066

ARMY

0.737515

0.406340

0.509069

0.427503

1.000000

0.594069

POLICE

0.815137

0.841706

0.852708

0.790066

0.594069

1.000000

PARTIES

0.702211

0.845271

0.834255

0.666906

0.336935

0.788376

IFE

0.569866

0.327124

0.356830

0.222216

0.560564

0.343427

BUSINESS

0.731807

0.911222

0.890104

0.909123

0.303362

0.718524

MEDIA

0.799359

0.813653

0.796111

0.808729

0.466112

0.712308

GDP

0.457236

0.568730

0.559691

0.648416

0.361946

0.515214

CCI

-0.155009

-0.324289

-0.169342

-0.529955

0.217405

-0.175230
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PARTIES

IFE

BUSINESS

MEDIA

GDP

CCI

PRESIDENT

0.702211

0.569866

0.731807

0.799359

0.457236

-0.155009

SENATORS

0.845271

0.327124

0.911222

0.813653

0.568730

-0.324289

DEPUTIES

0.834255

0.356830

0.890104

0.796111

0.559691

-0.169342

SUPRCOURT

0.666906

0.222216

0.909123

0.808729

0.648416

-0.529955

ARMY

0.336935

0.560564

0.303362

0.466112

0.361946

0.217405

POLICE

0.788376

0.343427

0.718524

0.712308

0.515214

-0.175230

PARTIES

1.000000

0.452203

0.657464

0.639471

0.335715

-0.133867

IFE

0.452203

1.000000

0.176429

0.481517

0.096089

0.256614

BUSINESS

0.657464

0.176429

1.000000

0.866916

0.703746

-0.437738

MEDIA

0.639471

0.481517

0.866916

1.000000

0.637440

-0.339508

GDP

0.335715

0.096089

0.703746

0.637440

1.000000

-0.126358

CCI

-0.133867

0.256614

-0.437738

-0.339508

-0.126358

1.000000

Correlations above 0.7 are marked in bold
Appendix E: Fitted Piecewise Trends
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Appendix G: Rankings
Ranking

April 2006

January 2011

Percentage Change

st

1

Army
7.5

Army
7.7

Deputies
35.7

2nd

Media
7

Media
7.6

Business
30.2

3rd

IFE
6.7

IFE and Supreme Court
7

Senators
27.7

4th

President
6.1

Business
6.9

Supreme Court
22.8

5th

Supreme Court
5.7

President
6.8

Political Parties
21.3

6th

Business
5.3

Senators
6

Police
16

7th

Police
5

Police
5.8

President
11.5

8th

Political Parties and
Senators
4.7

Political Parties and
Deputies
5.7

Media
8.6

9th

Deputies
4.2

IFE
4.5

10th

Army
2.7

Endnotes
1

The encapsulated trust model does not deny that people trust 			
institutions; it only states that this should not occur.

2

Unlike Hardin, Inglehart does believe that it is intelligible to trust an 		
institution.
		
3
The term functional is used instead of functionalist in order to avoid 		
confusion with structural functionalism
4

Notice that Offe’s argument explains when things are trusted, while 		
Hardin’s argument focuses on when they should be trusted. The 		
non-normativity of the defense of institutional trust implies that 		
the argument is easier to falsify with data.

5

Informal links refer to those ties where previous relationships 			
have already been established, while formal links are those formed among
agents that have had no previous relationship. For an institutionalist 		
explanation of how these links are supported see Nichols 1999.
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6

Putnam further draws the distinction between bonding trust (among kin)
and binding trust (among people from different groups). See Putnam 2000.

7

Offe and Inglehart have conflicting rather that opposing views since 		
Inglehart also believes that performance has an effect on institutional trust.
“It seems inconceivable that governmental performance would not 		
influence public opinion” (Inglehart, 294, 1997). Nevertheless, the 		
stark differences between the materialist and the functional argument 		
elaborated here remain valid.

8

This is certainly a naïve statement because economic development does not
always produce changes in culture and social structure (Inglehart, 117).

9

This may be changing in Mexico since the democratic transition in 2000.

10

See Appendix A for more information on the sample selection

11

Deputies in Mexico are analogous to Representatives in the US; both 		
comprise the Lower Chamber of Congress

12

The Instituto Federal Electoral is the autonomous institute that organizes
federal elections in Mexico

13

See Appendix B for more information on how the CCI is estimated

14

From observing the graphs located in the Appendix C, it is interesting to
note how CCI begins to drop before the 2007-2008 global economic crisis
hits.
		
15
See Appendix D for the table on correlations
16

The SIC is used to select the model that best explains the data by applying
a heavy penalty for degrees of freedom

17

The equivalent of trillion in English is billón in Spanish, while a billion in
English is mil millones in Spanish

18

See Appendix F

19

See rankings in Appendix G
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